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I. INTRODUCTION
There is no concept in modern constitutional law more controversial
than substantive due process. The controversy looming over this doctrine is
due, for the most part, to the tarnished reputation substantive due process
developed during the infamous “Lochner era,” in which courts used the Due
Process Clause arbitrarily to protect economic liberties from governmental
interference.2 Recognizing the error of its ways, however, the United States
Supreme Court has since repudiated economic substantive due process and
reformed the doctrine to protect only those rights that are considered

1
J.D., University of Dayton School of Law, 2012; B.A. in Political Science, 2007, Miami
University. I would like to thank my wife, Tasha, for her loving encouragement, support, and patience
throughout this process. I would also like to thank Professor Richard Saphire for his inspiration, helpful
comments, and insight.
2
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56–58 (1905).
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fundamental liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment.3
Yet the controversy surrounding the substantive due process
doctrine continues today due to fear both of the potentially unbridled power
of the Court to protect rights not enumerated in the Constitution, and of a
return to the dark days of the Lochner era.4 Now, the debate has turned to
the proper methodology for determining which personal rights are
fundamental and deserving of protection.5 The proper role of history and
tradition in making the determination of whether a right is fundamental is
one of the most hotly contested issues in modern substantive due process
analysis.6 One popular approach to this problem, the “history and tradition”
test championed on the Court by Justice Scalia, limits the category of
protected rights to those rights, stated at the most specific level of
generality, that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”7
This solution defines “rights” very specifically, and protects only those
rights that were traditionally protected and deemed fundamental to the
American scheme of ordered liberty by the framers of the United States
Constitution.8 Another popular approach, the “general support” test favored
by some of the more “liberal” members of the Court, does not limit the
analysis to a specific version of history and tradition. Rather, it defines
rights generally and seeks to determine whether there is some history
generally supporting the view that the questioned right deserves special
protection.9
The Court’s failure to provide guidance or define rules regarding
how history and tradition should be used has rendered the application of
either of the popular approaches unworkable for lower courts.10 The
arbitrary and oftentimes contradictory outcomes reached by the Court when
it appeals to “history and tradition” have resulted in a complete failure to
achieve the Court’s ultimate goal of instituting an objective standard in
order to rein in judicial discretion and promote consistency.11 To the
3

W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
See Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
5
See infra Part II.C.
6
See infra Part II.C.
7
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 192, 194 (1986) (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977))).
8
Id. at 124; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due
Process Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 540-42 (2012).
9
See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139–40 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (defining the asserted fundamental liberty
interest very generally).
10
The Court has used each of the popular approaches on numerous occasions yet has never
explicitly adopted either. Compare Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 (defining the asserted fundamental
liberty interest at its most specific level of generality), with Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (defining the asserted
fundamental liberty interest very generally).
11
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Because reasonable people can disagree
about the content of particular traditions . . . the plurality has not found the objective boundary that it
seeks.”).
4
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contrary, reliance upon history and tradition has created the same potential
for judicial discretion and abuse that the Court vowed to abstain from after
the Lochner era.12 This Comment argues that the Court should abandon
appeals to history and tradition in favor of a more objective and transparent
balancing test. This test determines whether an asserted right should be
protected by balancing the competing interests of the individual against the
interests of the government in regulating the right. This proposed test, while
not completely eradicating the potential for judicial discretion, will inject
more objectivity into the analysis and will produce more consistent and
predictable results.
Part II of this Comment begins with a discussion of the history of
the substantive due process doctrine in the Supreme Court. Specifically,
Part II will detail the onset of the doctrine in Lochner v. New York and the
reasons for the Court’s subsequent abandonment of that early understanding
of substantive due process.13 The Section will then discuss the early
attempts to revive the substantive due process doctrine after the Lochner era
and the Court’s ultimate transition to the modern history and tradition
approach it uses today. Finally, Part II closes with a discussion of the
Court’s history of applying the modern approach and details the opposing
views regarding how that standard should be applied.
Part III of this Comment opens with a discussion of the problematic
nature of using history and tradition to determine whether a right is deemed
fundamental under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The
Section then proposes that appeals to history and tradition should be
abandoned in favor of a more objective balancing test. This proposed test
determines whether a right is fundamental and therefore protected by
weighing the individual’s interest in retaining the right against the
government’s interest in regulating the right. Part IV concludes the
Comment with a summary of the problematic nature of the modern approach
and the reasons the proposed solution will help solve many of these issues.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Early Substantive Due Process: The Rise and Fall of Economic
Substantive Due Process
During the first third of the 20th century, substantive due process
was used primarily to protect economic liberties from government
interference.14 This era, aptly named the “Lochner era,” began with the
12

See, e.g., Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See id. at 56–58 (holding that the freedom of contract is protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
13
14
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Supreme Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York.15 In Lochner, the Court
struck down a New York law that limited the maximum number of hours
that bakers could work.16 The Court stated that freedom of contract is a
basic right protected as a liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and that this right could only be interfered with by
the government to serve a valid police purpose.17 Concluding that the law
was not a valid exercise of the state’s police power, the Court held that it
was unconstitutional because it infringed upon the constitutionally protected
freedom of contract. So began the Lochner era, an era of economic
substantive due process.18
During the three decades following the Court’s decision in Lochner,
over two hundred laws were invalidated for infringing upon freedom of
contract.19 However, due to the economic crisis the nation faced during the
Great Depression, a growing majority of the country, including President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, developed the view that governmental economic
regulations were essential to recovery.20 These outside pressures culminated
in 1937 when the Court unequivocally ended the idea of economic
substantive due process in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.21
In Parrish, the Court overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital and
upheld a state law that mandated a minimum wage for women.22 Writing
for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes unambiguously ended the laissez-faire
jurisprudence of the Lochner era and questioned whether freedom of
contract even existed under the Constitution.23 He stated: “[w]hat is this
freedom [of contract]? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of
contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without
due process of law.”24 Upon finding that there was no such thing as
freedom to contract reserved in the Constitution, the Court’s time of
protecting that freedom as a fundamental right finally came to an end, and
15

See generally id.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 53 (“The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of
the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . The right to purchase or to sell labor is part
of the liberty protected by this amendment . . . .”). Additionally, the Court defined “police powers” as
those designed to protect “the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public.” Id.
18
Id. at 64.
19
See, e.g., Weaver v. Palmer Bros., Co., 270 U.S. 402, 415 (1926) (striking down a state law that
prohibited the use of low grade rags and debris in making mattresses); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,
261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (striking down a minimum wage law for women); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (declaring unconstitutional a federal law prohibiting employers from requiring
employees not to unionize); see also Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of
Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 751, 754 n.19 (2009).
20
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 623–24 (3d ed. 2009).
21
See generally W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
22
Id. at 400. Adkins was decided during the Lochner era and struck down a law that mandated a
minimum wage for women because the Court found it infringed upon the constitutionally protected
freedom of contract. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 561–62.
23
Parrish, 300 U.S. at 391.
24
Id.
16
17

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol39/iss2/4

2014]

FUNDAMENTAL OR FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED?

265

the idea of substantive due process itself became dormant.25
One year later, however, the Court revived the notion that certain
rights, although not enumerated in the Constitution, could nonetheless
receive heightened protection under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., the Court
articulated a new policy of deference to governmental economic regulations.
26
This policy of deference, however, was qualified by the still-famous
Footnote 4.27 Footnote 4 stated that the Court would exercise deference in
the case of economic regulations but that certain special situations might
require more exacting judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.28
Situations dealing with certain fundamental rights or “prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities” were among these “special condition[s]”
noted by the Court.29 The Court has relied on this aspect of the Carolene
decision in forming modern day substantive due process doctrine.30
The reign of the economic substantive due process doctrine during
the Lochner line of cases has been considered one of the most condemned
eras of the Court in United States history and is regarded as a quintessential
example of illicit judicial activism and abuse.31 Indeed, determining
whether a law is unconstitutional because it infringes upon rights not
explicitly enumerated in the constitution is a dangerous task that should not
be undertaken lightly.32 This is especially true considering that federal
judges are unelected and serve for life.33 As Justice White noted, the
judiciary “is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots
in the language or even the design of the Constitution.”34 Considering the
delicate nature of substantive due process analysis, the Court’s flirtation
with illegitimacy can be attributed to a failure to develop principles that
limited the amount of judicial discretion in making these types of
25

Id. at 400.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153–54 (1938).
Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted) (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the Fourteenth. . . . It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire . . . whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859,
894–95 (2009); Erin Daly, The New Liberty, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 221, 245–46 (2005).
31
See Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
32
See id.
33
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
34
Moore, 431 U.S. at 544 (White, J., dissenting).
26
27

Published by eCommons, 2013

266

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:2

determinations.
Despite the consensus today that Lochner was a complete abuse of
judicial power, the case is nevertheless important to modern constitutional
law, not because of the holding or logic of the Court, but rather because it
serves as a prime example of what the Court ought not to do. The decision
has become a guidepost that judges must consider before making a
determination that may involve a subjective analysis or a judgment call.35
Lochner stands as a guidepost to which judges must look in virtually all
situations, but it is most important in a field like substantive due process
where there are no concrete rules or tests to sufficiently limit the scope of
the judges’ opinions.36
B. Modern-Day Substantive Due Process: Privacy, Personhood, and
Family
Though the substantive due process doctrine undoubtedly emerged
from the Lochner era with much disdain, it is generally agreed that the
doctrine still lives on today.37 With the idea of economic substantive due
process out of the question, however, the Court seldom relied on substantive
due process in the years following the Lochner era because the doctrine
lacked a defined scope and purpose.38 It was not until 1965 in Griswold v.
Connecticut that the Court finally began transitioning to the modern idea of
substantive due process—the protection of the right to privacy and other
fundamental rights.39
In Griswold, the Court found a law prohibiting married couples
from purchasing contraceptives to be unconstitutional for violating the
constitutionally protected “right to privacy . . . .”40 Writing for the Court,
Justice Douglas noted that although the Bill of Rights does not explicitly
mention “privacy,” the right could be found in the “penumbras” and
“emanations” of other constitutional protections.41
This penumbral
approach was essentially a substantive due process argument, but Justice
Douglas—with Lochner in mind—opted not to label it as such to avoid

35

Id.
Id.
37
Even the strictest originalists agree that the Due Process Clause protects certain unenumerated
rights. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (“It is true that despite the language of
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which appears to focus only on the
processes by which life, liberty, or property is taken, the cases are legion in which those Clauses have
been interpreted to have substantive content, subsuming rights that to a great extent are immune from
federal or state regulation or proscription.”).
38
See Aaron J. Shuler, From Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and Who We Want
to Be with the “Equalerty” of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 220,
246–47 (2010).
39
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 484.
36
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using the controversial substantive due process term.42 Justice Harlan, on
the other hand, did not have the same wariness in his concurring opinion, in
which he argued that this right to privacy is protected not by the Bill of
Rights itself but by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43
He argued that the statute violated due process by infringing on “basic
values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”44
Eight years later, in Roe v. Wade,45 the Court finally adopted Justice
Harlan’s approach and thereby revived the substantive due process
doctrine.46 Roe represented the first time since the Lochner era that the
Court premised an opinion on substantive due process.47 In striking down a
Texas law making it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion, the Court
breathed new life into the Due Process Clause.48 Finally defining the scope
of the modern substantive due process doctrine, the Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects rights that are
“‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ . . . .”49 The
Court also reaffirmed the standard of review from Footnote 4 of Carolene
Products, holding that where “fundamental rights are involved . . .
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state
interest and . . . legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express
only the legitimate state interests at stake.”50 Since this revival of
substantive due process and its protection of the right to privacy, the Court
has expanded the ambit of these fundamental privacy rights to include the
right to marry, have children, educate one’s children, enjoy marital privacy,
use contraception, and have abortions.51
The modern approach to substantive due process is best exemplified
by the Court’s decision in Washington v. Glucksberg.52 In Glucksberg, the
Court was faced with the question of whether the right to assisted suicide
was a fundamental liberty interest deserving heightened protection under the
Due Process Clause.53 The Court began by noting the delicate situation it is
in when asked to determine whether a right is fundamental.54 The Court
stated:
But we “have always been reluctant to expand the concept
42

See Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review; Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner,
61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 305–06 (1986).
43
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499–500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
44
Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
45
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46
Id. at 152–53.
47
CHEMERINKSY, supra note 20, at 82.
48
Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.
49
Id. at 152 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
50
Id. at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
51
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citations omitted).
52
Id. at 720–21.
53
Id. at 705–06.
54
Id. at 720.
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of substantive due process because guideposts for
responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are
scarce and open-ended.” By extending constitutional
protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a
great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public
debate and legislative action. We must therefore “exercise
the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground
in this field,” lest the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of
the Members of this Court.55
Considering the potentially dangerous amount of discretion and
personal judgment that tends to go hand-in-hand with substantive due
process cases, the Court announced a two-part test meant to infuse
objectivity into the analysis.56 The first step of the analysis required a
“careful description” of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.57 Once the
asserted fundamental liberty interest was defined, the Court would then
determine whether that interest was “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that
‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the interest] were sacrificed.’”58 If
the asserted right met that standard, then it would be considered a protected
fundamental liberty interest, and the state’s regulation would have to meet
strict scrutiny to be upheld.59 That is, in order to be upheld, the state’s law
would have to be both in furtherance of a compelling state interest and
narrowly tailored to address that compelling interest.60 If the right did not
meet the criteria then it would not be considered a fundamental right, and
the Court would apply a rational basis test in which the law would be upheld
so long as it was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.61
Applying this two-part test, the Court in Glucksberg determined that
the right to assisted suicide was not a fundamental right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.62 The Court began by
defining the asserted liberty interest narrowly, as the “right to commit
suicide with another’s assistance.”63 The Court then held that this right was
not deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition based on the
“consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the [right to

55

Id. (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)) (citations omitted).
Id. at 720–21.
57
Id. at 721.
58
Id. at 721 (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)) (citations omitted).
59
Id. at 722.
60
Id. at 721.
61
Id. at 722.
62
Id. at 723.
63
Id. at 724.
56

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol39/iss2/4

2014]

FUNDAMENTAL OR FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED?

269

assisted suicide], and continues explicitly to reject it today . . . .”64 Because
the asserted right was not fundamental, the Court applied the rational basis
test and upheld the law, finding that it rationally related to furthering the
state’s legitimate interest in the preservation of human life.65
This modern approach represents a significant improvement over
the Court’s earlier substantive due process jurisprudence because it tends to
limit the subjectivity of those early cases in which judges, not bound by any
objective standard, relied solely on their personal views.66 Relying on a test
which requires looking to United States history, legal traditions, and
practices provides an improved, although not highly effective, guidepost for
responsible judicial decisionmaking that “direct[s] and restrain[s] [the
Court’s] exposition of the Due Process Clause.”67 By allowing the
importance of the claimed right to be determined by an “objective” source
rather than judges’ personal views, the modern approach provides for a
substantive due process analysis that protects basic rights while continuing
to further distance itself from the activism associated with the Lochner era.68
However, as the next Section will demonstrate, the highly divergent
opinions on how the history and tradition test should be applied evidence the
test’s ultimate failure to achieve the objectivity and consistency it purported
to deliver.
C. Difficulties in Applying the Glucksberg Test
Although the two-part test from Glucksberg seems fairly
straightforward, the application of this “history and tradition” test has been
anything but. As a result, the Court’s decisions on this issue have been
highly inconsistent in both their reasoning and ultimate outcome. This is
due, for the most part, to the stark contrast in how judges have engaged in
the first step of the analysis: defining the asserted right. Originalist judges
tend to define the asserted right at the most specific level, while
nonoriginalists continue to define the asserted right at a more general level
of abstraction.69 This difference of opinion has proved to be anything but a
minor factor in the substantive due process analysis. At a sufficiently
general level of abstraction, nearly any liberty can be justified as consistent
with the nation’s history and traditions; whereas, at a very specific level of
abstraction, few non-textual rights will be justified using that same history
and tradition.
One of the most famous examples showing the divergence of
64

Id. at 723.
Id. at 728–31.
66
See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
67
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
68
See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3100–02 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69
Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (originalist view), with id. at
140–41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (nonoriginalist view).
65
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opinions on this issue is the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.70 In Michael
H., the Court considered the constitutionality of a California law that created
a conclusive presumption that a child born to a married woman is also the
child of that woman’s husband.71 The plaintiff, a man who had an affair
with the mother and was the natural father of the child, challenged the law
as a violation of his constitutionally protected liberty interest in his
relationship with the child.72 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated that
before looking to history and tradition, it is necessary to define the asserted
right at “the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”73 Accordingly,
Justice Scalia posed the issue as “whether the relationship between persons
in the situation of Michael and [his wife] has been treated as a protected
family unit under the historic practices of our society, or whether on any
other basis it has been accorded special protection.”74 Defining the asserted
right as such, Justice Scalia held that there was no fundamental right in this
particular situation, concluding that “[w]e have found nothing in the older
sources . . . addressing specifically the power of the natural father to assert
parental rights over a child born into a woman’s existing marriage with
another man.”75 To the contrary, he argued “our traditions have protected
the marital family . . . .”76
Justice Brennan wrote a sharp dissent in Michael H. in which he
characterized Justice Scalia’s approach of defining the right at the most
specific level as “novel” and “misguided,” and argued that Justice Scalia’s
methodology was highly problematic.77 He stated that “[t]oday’s plurality . .
. does not ask whether parenthood is an interest that historically has received
our attention and protection; the answer to that question is too clear for
dispute.”78 Rather, Brennan continued, Justice Scalia asked “whether the
specific variety of parenthood under consideration—a natural father’s
relationship with a child whose mother is married to another man—has
enjoyed such protection.”79 Justice Brennan stated that the right should have
been defined more broadly as whether a natural parent has a right to a
relationship with his or her child. 80 He argued that, “[i]n construing the
Fourteenth Amendment to offer shelter only to those interests specifically
protected by historical practice,” Justice Scalia’s approach “ignores the kind

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

See generally id.
Id. at 113.
Id.
Id. at 127 n.6.
Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
Id. at 125.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id. at 140–41.
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of society in which our Constitution exists.”81
Justice Scalia’s most specific level approach has been largely
criticized on many grounds. One of the major criticisms is that this
approach stifles judicial protection of important rights.82 The crux of this
argument is that if the Court had used this approach in past cases, many of
the important rights we now enjoy would not have been protected.83 It has
also been criticized on the grounds that it is not derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s text or history,84 that it does not carry out the purpose of
protecting minority interests,85 and that it is just as speculative and
ambiguous as any other approach.86
The alternative approach to Justice Scalia’s methodology, however,
does not come without its critics as well. This approach, championed by
nonoriginalists such as Justice Kennedy, defines the asserted right on a more
general level.87 For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,88 Justice
Kennedy defined the asserted fundamental liberty interest not as the right to
have an abortion, but rather as the right “to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”89
The most prevalent criticism of this approach is that if judges define the
asserted right generally, then it is nearly impossible to find a history and
tradition to support that right.90
The problematic nature of the history and tradition test and its
arbitrary and inconsistent application was best showcased in the case of
81

Id. at 141.
See Timothy P. Loper, Substantive Due Process and Discourse Ethics: Rethinking Fundamental
Rights Analysis, 13 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 41, 70 (2006).
83
See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 122) (“If [the
Court] had looked to tradition with such specificity in past cases, many a decision would have reached a
different result. Surely the use of contraceptives by unmarried couples, the freedom from corporal
punishment in schools, the freedom from an arbitrary transfer from a prison to a psychiatric institution,
and even the right to raise one’s natural but illegitimate children, were not ‘interest[s] traditionally
protected by our society . . . .’”) (citations omitted).
84
See id. at 138.
85
See Edward Gary Spitko, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia's Approach to Fundamental Rights
Adjudication, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1337, 1353 (1990).
86
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Michael H., Justice Brennan maintained
that Justice Scalia was “[a]pparently oblivious to the fact that [tradition] can be as malleable and as
elusive as ‘liberty’ itself, . . . [and that he] has not found the objective boundary that [he] seeks.” Id.
Justice Brennan continued: “The pretense [that tradition can limit discretion] is seductive; it would be
comforting to believe that a search for ‘tradition’ involves nothing more idiosyncratic or complicated
than poring through dusty volumes on American history. Yet, as Justice White observed . . . ‘[w]hat the
deeply rooted traditions of the country are is arguable.’” Id. (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 549 (1977) (White, J, dissenting)).
87
See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(in which Justice Kennedy defined the asserted right as the right “to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”).
88
See generally id.
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Id. at 851.
90
See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (1989) (opining that a rule that does not look to a
particular and specific tradition leads to arbitrary decisionmaking and “leav[es] judges free to decide as
they think best when the unanticipated occurs . . . .”).
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Bowers v. Hardwick91 and the case that overruled it, Lawrence v. Texas.92
Both Bowers and Lawrence had similar fact patterns in which homosexual
men were facing criminal prosecution for engaging in the act of sodomy in
their homes. The outcome in Lawrence, however, wholly contradicted the
conclusion reached in Bowers regarding whether the asserted right was
protected.93 More troubling than the contradiction itself, though, is the fact
that the only real reason for the contradiction seems to be that the majority
in Lawrence arbitrarily decided to define the asserted right more generally
than it did in Bowers.94 The Court in Bowers defined the asserted
fundamental liberty interest narrowly, asking “whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy . . . .”95 Finding that “[p]roscriptions against that conduct have
ancient roots,” the Court held that homosexuals did not have a fundamental
right to engage in sodomy in their respective homes.96
When this question was revisited in Lawrence, however, the Court
opted to define the fundamental liberty interest at stake more generally. The
Lawrence Court asked whether “liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining
to sex.”97 Generalizing the fundamental liberty interest to the right of adults
to a private sex life as opposed to the right of homosexuals to engage in
sodomy, the Court found ample historical evidence to support its decision
that such a right is fundamental and deserves constitutional protection.98
The most troubling aspect of the Lawrence decision was not the
result.99 Rather, the most troublesome aspect of Lawrence was how easily
the Court, recognizing that homosexual persons are much more accepted in
society today than they were when Bowers was decided over fifteen years
earlier, arbitrarily altered how it defined the asserted right to reach the
Justices’ desired outcome. It is this ability to change the analysis in order to
reach a desired outcome that best exemplifies the problems associated with
the application of the history and tradition test. The fact that the Court can
reach such blatantly opposite results on so many occasions shows that the
91

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
93
Id. at 581–85.
94
Id. at 566–67 (holding that the asserted right was fundamental and thereby overruling the
opposite decision reached in Bowers).
95
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
96
Id. at 192, 196.
97
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
98
Id. at 567.
99
Indeed, those who agree that homosexuals should not have the right to engage in a private sex life
are part of a rapidly diminishing minority in modern society. See, e.g., Peyton M. Craighill & Scott
Clement, Support for same-sex Marriage hits new high; half say Constitution Guarantees right, WASH.
POST (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/support-for-same-sex-marriage-hits-newhigh-half-say-constitution-guarantees-right/2014/03/04/f737e87e-a3e5-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.
html.
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only consistency in this area is inconsistency itself. This is especially
troublesome in the substantive due process arena, considering its
treacherous past in the Lochner era.100 As Justice White famously stated in
Bowers, “[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.”101 As the
Analysis section of this Comment suggests below, there is a great need for
considerable reform of the substantive due process doctrine.102 The
protection of the most basic human rights in our democratic society is a task
far too important to be left to a judge who has no concrete restraints or rules
guiding his analysis.
III. ANALYSIS
To address the still unresolved tensions inherent in modern
substantive due process jurisprudence, the Court should abandon its reliance
on history and tradition in determining whether a right is fundamental. The
constant technological breakthroughs and adapting societal attitudes of
modern times make the historical approach arbitrary and irrelevant to the
question of the importance of certain rights today. This section begins with
a description of the many problems associated with using history as the
standard in substantive due process doctrine, and provides reasons the Court
should abandon this practice. To address the glaring problems surrounding
the use of history as the proper standard in substantive due process cases,
this Comment next argues that the Court should adopt a balancing test that
weighs the interests of the individual in keeping the right against the
government’s interest in regulating the right.
A. The Modern History and Tradition Approach to Substantive Due Process
Should be Abandoned
The history and tradition test is not flawed only because of its
malleability and subjectivity. The very logic upon which it rests is flawed
as well. The purpose of the substantive due process doctrine is to protect
individuals against majoritarian policy enactments that exceed the limits of
governmental authority—that is, its purpose is to protect minority interests
and other rights that our society deems deserving of heightened
protection.103 As explained below, there are many reasons why the history
and tradition test does not effectuate this purpose.
First, the history and tradition test does not adequately protect the
100

McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3100–01 (2010).
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
See infra Part III.
103
TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW 90–
100 (2010).
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interests of the minority due to its circular nature. The history and tradition
test is circular in that it examines whether an asserted right is deserving of
protection by asking whether that right was valued and protected in the
past.104 In this respect, relying on history makes the analysis incomplete
because it will not protect the minority; rather, it will only protect those who
have a tradition of protection and, therefore, need it the least. Thus, reliance
on history will tend to only protect those rights that the majoritarian political
process has already protected and will necessarily fail to protect the rights of
the minority.105
Next, the history and tradition test is logically flawed in that history
often has little bearing on the present. It has been argued that the history
and tradition test is at odds with the democratic nature of our government.106
As one commentator put it, the “overtly backward-looking character [of
history and tradition] highlights its undemocratic nature: it is hard to square
with the theory of our government the proposition that yesterday’s majority .
. . should control today’s.”107 Moreover, the history and tradition test fails to
compensate for the fact that certain historical values either change over time
or become completely wrong considering advances in technology.108 As
Justice Blackmun stated:
“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.”109
Given that the practical significance and public understanding of asserted
rights evolve and change on such a frequent basis, determining whether a
right is fundamental to our society by looking to history will often lead to a
result that is in direct conflict with the modern-day understanding of such
rights.110
Finally, the modern approach is flawed in that the understanding of
what is historically significant is often conflicting and inconsistent

104
David Crump, How do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights?
Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 795, 861 (1996).
105
Id.
106
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 62–63 (1980).
107
Id. at 62.
108
See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In the
plurality’s constitutional universe, we may not take notice of the fact that the original reasons for the
conclusive presumption of paternity are out of place in a world in which blood tests can prove virtually
beyond a shadow of a doubt who sired a particular child and in which the fact of illegitimacy no longer
plays the burdensome and stigmatizing role it once did.”).
109
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Oliver W.
Holmes, The Path of The Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
110
McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3117–18 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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depending on the account on which the judge relies.111 The conflicting
accounts of history lead to the high potential that this standard will be
abused. It is nearly impossible to consult history and find a conclusion that
is indisputable.112 Conversely, it is almost always possible to find historical
justification for nearly any preconceived outcome the judge desires. The
potential for a judge to make a decision and then justify it by cherry-picking
bits and pieces of history evinces the standard’s complete lack of
objectivity.
B. A Proposed Alternative to Replace the History and Tradition Standard
Due to its manipulability (and often times inapplicability) to modern
views on rights and liberties, the history and tradition test should no longer
be the touchstone for determining whether a right is fundamental in modern
times. Instead, the Court should adopt a balancing test in which it
determines, on a case-by-case basis, whether the government overstepped its
authority by balancing the competing interests of the individual in
maintaining the asserted right against the government’s interest in regulating
that right. This proposed alternative mirrors the test used for determining
the adequacy of procedures under the similar doctrine of procedural due
process from Matthews v. Eldridge.113
1. Explanation of the Proposed Balancing test
The proposed balancing test has three steps, each of which are
discussed below. The first step of the proposed balancing test requires the
Court to define the interests of the individual in keeping the right. When
determining the extent of the individual’s interest, the Court should focus on
two factors: (1) the importance of the right to the individual, and (2) the
seriousness of the consequences for the individual if deprived of that right,
including whether the individual has any other alternatives available.114
Step two of the proposed balancing test requires the Court to define
the interests of the government in regulating the right. There are several
factors that determine the extent of the government’s interest in this
analysis. First, it is necessary for the Court to determine whether the
government is regulating in a purely private area or whether it is regulating a
111

See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that history and tradition
“can be as malleable and as elusive as ‘liberty’ itself . . . . The pretense [that history and tradition can
limit discretion] is seductive; it would be comforting to believe that a search for ‘tradition’ involves
nothing more idiosyncratic or complicated than poring through dusty volumes on American history.”).
112
See, e.g., id. (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 549 (1977) (White, J., dissenting))
(“What the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is arguable.”).
113
See generally Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The test in Matthews holds that, to
determine “whether the administrative procedures provided . . . are constitutionally sufficient requires
[an] analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected.” Id. at 334 (citation omitted).
114
Id. at 334–35.
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public matter.115 The more the government regulates a purely private area,
the less weight should be assigned to the government’s purported interest in
regulating it. Next, the Court should look to the government’s stated
reasons for infringing upon the right. The particular weight of these
interests should be determined by looking at the extent to which they relate
to the traditional police powers of the state.116 Finally, the Court should
determine the seriousness of the consequences to the government if the law
were struck down and whether the interests of the government could be
effectuated without infringing upon the right at issue.
Step Three is simply a balancing of the competing interests of the
individual and the government. When weighing the interests, the judge
should determine whose interests are most important. This step would
require a judge to state, on the record, her reasons for determining that one
interest outweighs another. If the individual’s interest outweighs the
government’s interest in regulating the right, then the law is an
unconstitutional infringement on liberty. However, if the government’s
interest in regulating the right is higher than the individual’s right in
retaining the interest, then the law must be upheld.
2. Benefits and Criticisms of the Proposed Balancing test
Balancing interests on a case-by-case basis rather than looking to
history and tradition in each case will better protect those rights that are
presently deemed important by society and will address many of the
shortcomings of the modern approach described above. Most importantly,
requiring judges to assess the importance of the right by looking directly to
its significance to the individual in the case, rather than its importance in
history and tradition, will better protect the interests of the minority. The
present-focused nature of the balancing test will also improve upon the
history and tradition standard’s failure to recognize that values change over
time. A judge applying the balancing test will determine, in each individual
situation, whether the asserted right is too important to the individual to
allow the government to regulate it. Looking at the unique circumstances of
the individual to determine the interests at stake will adequately take into
account values and interests as they stand in the individual’s current
115
A purely private area would be one that included, for example, one’s personal thoughts, feelings,
bodily integrity, or one’s intimate relationships. This would also include conduct that takes place in the
privacy of one’s home and does not affect the public in any substantial manner. By contrast, a purely
public matter would include, for instance, the regulation of public areas, of commercial activity, or of
government benefits. In other words, regulation in areas that tend to affect the public as a whole and not
simply the actions of individuals specifically.
116
See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 593 (1906). “Police
powers” include regulations to promote public health, morals, and safety and add to general public
convenience, prosperity, and welfare. Id. at 592. Actions in furtherance of a state’s police powers are
given more weight under this analysis based on the traditional notion that states are acting appropriately
when promoting such interests. Id. at 592–93.
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situation and not as they were in the past.
The proposed balancing test also improves upon the history and
tradition approach by increasing the transparency of the judge’s
determination and thereby lessening the potential for abuse. A judge
applying the proposed balancing test will have to cite all of the individual’s
and government’s interests at stake and then justify the reason for her
decision as to which interest is more important. Listing all of the interests
the judge took into consideration and assigning relative weight to each on
the record promotes transparency as to why the judge reached a particular
decision. Using the history and tradition test, judges simply need to cite to a
particular view of history to justify the decision they reached. Forcing
judges to go through a process, in which they define each interest, assign
weight to each interest, and then make a reasoned decision based upon the
relative weight of each interest will cut down on the potential for abuse by
forcing judges to explain themselves on the record throughout each step of
the analysis.
Despite the many benefits the proposed balancing test has over the
modern history and tradition approach, it is by no means a perfect solution
to the inherent problems of substantive due process and will likely invite
many criticisms of its own. One of the main arguments against this
proposed approach will likely be that, in leaving judges alone to determine
which interests are important, it does not foreclose the potential for abuse.
The potential for abuse can never be eradicated. The established and listed
criteria used by the proposed standard, however, result in much less
discretion than is typically involved in the “picking and choosing” that is
inherent to using the history and tradition standard.117 Judges applying the
history and tradition standard are faced with the insurmountable task of
looking to history, as a whole, and deciphering a single conclusion from that
infinite amount of available information. Judges applying the proposed
standard, on the other hand, would look only to the interests of the two
parties in court, which is a decidedly smaller amount of information to
choose from than simply history in general.
Critics will also likely argue that this proposed standard is
unpredictable due to the fact that courts will apply the test on a case-by-case
basis and will not rely on determinations made by past decisions. What this
standard presumably lacks in predictability, however, it will make up for
with consistency. Current Supreme Court doctrine is highly inconsistent in
that it fails to apply the history and tradition standard in the same manner
every time.118 The proposed standard, however, creates stricter guideposts
that narrow the Court’s analysis and results in minimal opportunity for an
117
118
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abuse of discretion. Being constricted in their respective analyses, all
members of the Court will more often reach decisions in a similar manner.
This will result in greater consistency and ultimately more predictability.
3. Hypothetical Applications of the Proposed Balancing test
This section showcases the application of the proposed balancing
test. The following hypothetical applications show that this proposed
standard, even though it may not yield the same results as the history and
tradition approach, is more transparent and allows for readers to understand
why a certain outcome was reached. The detailed steps a judge must follow
when applying this proposed test result in more consistent outcomes and,
most importantly, a detailed explanation on the record for why the judge
reached a certain decision.
a. Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide: Proposed Analysis Results
in Same Outcome as History and Tradition Approach
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court considered whether there
was a constitutional right to assistance in committing suicide.119 Using the
modern history and tradition test, the Court determined that the right was not
fundamental and therefore not entitled to special protection under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.120 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on the fact that it was a crime to assist a suicide
in almost every state and almost every western democracy.121
The first step of the proposed balancing test is to define the right at
stake at its most specific level. Here, the specific right asserted is the right
to physician-assisted suicide. Once the right is defined, the proposed
balancing test next requires a consideration of the interests of the individuals
in having the right to physician-assisted suicide. The private interests here
include the individual’s interest in dying on their own terms, and the interest
in being relieved of chronic pain at the end of their lives. Analysis of the
individual’s right then looks to the seriousness of the consequences if he or
she was deprived of that right. The main consequence includes the
possibility that an individual will have to endure more pain until they later
die naturally. Another possible consequence if the person were deprived of
the right, however, is the chance that the individual regains their health and
ultimately lives longer.
After defining the individual interests at stake, the proposed test
then considers the government’s interest in regulating the right. The extent
119

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
See id. at 723.
Id. The Court held there was “a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected
the [right to assisted suicide], and continues explicitly to reject it today . . . .” Id.
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of the government’s interest depends on three separate determinations: (1)
the extent to which the government is regulating a purely private activity;
(2) the legitimacy and seriousness of the government’s stated reasons for
regulating the right; and (3) whether the government has any alternatives by
which it could still effect its primary interests while not completely
infringing on the right at stake.
Here, it is clear that the activity being regulated—the right to
physician-assisted suicide—is not purely private or public. While the
patient’s right to physician-assisted suicide is private because it deals with
an individual’s desire to die on his own terms, the physician’s right to assist
with the suicide is a public matter because it deals with an entire profession
that is heavily regulated. Next, the governmental interests at stake include
the primary interest of preservation of life, the interest in protecting the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession, and the interest in protecting
vulnerable groups.122 Finally, there are no viable alternatives for the
government to effectuate its primary interest of preserving human life.
There is simply no way for the government to allow physician-assisted
suicide and protect its interest in preserving life at the same time.
The final step of the proposed test requires a careful balancing of all
the interests at stake. Here, the government’s compelling interest in the
preservation of life and the lack of any alternatives to achieving this
compelling interest weigh heavily in favor of the government’s interest.
While the individual interest in dying on one’s own terms is important, the
consequences of the deprivation of this right are not severe enough to
outweigh the government’s strong interest and lack of alternatives.
Moreover, the possibility that an individual could overcome the pain and
enjoy their continued life weighs heavily against the private interest at stake.
The individual’s interest and the consequences at stake cannot overcome the
government’s important interest in preserving life and the lack of viable
alternatives for effectuating this purpose. Thus, the proposed test would not
protect this right.
b. Right to Own Handguns–Proposed Analysis Results in Different
Outcome Than History and Tradition Approach
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court was faced with the
question of whether individuals have the right to possess handguns in their
homes.123 The Court concluded that the Second Amendment’s right to bear
arms—specifically, handguns—was incorporated by and therefore
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.124 If the Court
122
123
124
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analyzed this question under substantive due process rather than
incorporation, however, and applied the proposed balancing test, the
outcome would have been different.
The first step of the proposed balancing test—defining the right in
its most specific level of generality—requires defining the right as the right
to own handguns in the home for self-defense. The next step of the
proposed test is to define and value the interests of individuals in keeping
the right, which requires a consideration of the importance of the right to the
individual and the seriousness of the consequences to the individual if he
were deprived of the right. The importance of the right at issue is not highly
important to the individual in this situation. While the individual has an
important interest in self-defense, he does not have a very important interest
in self-defense with a handgun. The ban of handguns is not a complete ban
on all types of firearms, only handguns. Therefore, the individual can
promote her interest in defending herself through other means, such as
owning a rifle or another type of weapon that is not a handgun. For this
reason, the consequences of a deprivation of the right to own handguns
would likewise not be very serious. Individuals can still own firearms for
the purpose of defending themselves; they simply cannot own handguns for
this reason.
The next step of the proposed balancing test considers the interests
of the government in regulating the asserted right. First, it should be noted
that, although the right being regulated deals with private conduct in the
home, it should not be considered a purely private matter. The possession of
handguns may have a direct effect on the amount of gun violence in a
particular locale, which in turn has a direct impact on that community.
Therefore, the government should not be considered to be regulating a
purely private matter even though the asserted right occurs in the home.
Additionally, the government has a strong and important interest in
public safety that is served by prohibiting handguns. Handguns are more
dangerous than rifles because they can be hidden, and the government
therefore has a strong interest in promoting public safety in regulating this
right. And the government has narrowly tailored its regulations to promote
this interest. Finding that a large majority of shootings in the city were
perpetrated by handguns instead of other types of firearms, the government
only chose to regulate handguns and left alone the right to own other types
of firearms.125
Finally, moving to the last step—weighing the interests of the
individual and government—application of the proposed balancing test
would likely find that the government’s interest in regulating the right to
125
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own handguns outweighs the interest of the individual. This conclusion is
based on the relatively low consequences suffered by individuals in
effectuating their important interest in self-defense, as compared to the
government’s very important interest in promoting public safety by
prohibiting the type of firearm most responsible for violence within the city.
Individuals still have the ability to defend themselves with a firearm even if
the government bans the possession of handguns. Since the ability to defend
oneself using other firearms remains intact, the individual has only a
marginal interest in owning handguns. This marginal interest is easily
outweighed by the government’s very important interest in promoting public
safety by prohibiting the biggest culprits of violence in the city. Application
of the proposed test, therefore, would likely come to a different conclusion
than the one reached in McDonald but with more information on the record
to support the reasons for reaching such a contrary decision.
c. Same-Sex Marriage—The Proposed Analysis Would Result in
the Protection of this Right
A question sure to be considered more frequently in the near future
is whether individuals have the right to marry another of the same sex.
Although the Court has not had occasion to confront this issue specifically,
it will likely have the opportunity to do so in the upcoming years.126 If the
Court were to use the analysis proposed by this Comment, the outcome
would likely result in the protection of the right to marry others of the same
sex.
To begin the analysis, the right at issue, defined at its most specific
level, would be defined as the right of a man or woman to marry another of
the same sex. The interests of the individuals would consist of the interest
in marrying whomever they want, the opportunity to enter into a legal bond
with another, and the opportunity to avail themselves of the legal benefits of
marriage. While the deprivation of these interests is likely not dire to the
individuals, they are nevertheless highly important interests. For instance,
while a gay couple can still have a relationship without being married, there
are many benefits and privileges of marriage that they could not enjoy such
as “hospital visitation,” “the ability to obtain ‘family’ health coverage,”
“taxation and inheritance rights,” the “role as parent of their children,” or
“protection in case the relationship ends.”127 These benefits can hardly be
considered unimportant to the lives of gay couples. With respect to the
extent of the deprivation, this varies depending on the state. Obviously in
126
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states where gay marriage is completely banned, the individuals experience
a total deprivation of the right. However, even in states that recognize civil
unions or domestic partnerships, there is still essentially a total deprivation
of the right. This is due to the fact that the relationship is still not
recognized outside of the state and only some of the privileges and benefits
of marriage are available to domestic partners and the like.
Next, the governmental interest analysis begins with determining
the extent to which the ban on gay marriage regulates a purely private area.
In this case, it is obvious that the right to marry the person of one’s choosing
is a very private matter.
This factor weighs heavily against the
government’s interests in this case. Next, the government has many
interests supporting its ban of gay marriage. First, the government has an
interest in regulating marriage with respect to the benefits and privileges
given by the state to spouses. This is an important interest because the state
has the ultimate discretion, for the most part, to determine who will receive
certain benefits it offers. Next, the government would argue that it has an
interest in upholding the values of its citizens and the traditional marital
ideals. This interest, however, is very weak due to the fact that it is
grounded in prejudice against a class of persons. Finally, the government
would argue that it has an important interest in regulating marriage in order
to encourage procreation, which will not result from the marriage of gay
couples.
Furthermore, the government would argue that there are
alternatives to marriage available to gay couples, such as civil unions and
domestic partnerships. However, as discussed earlier, these do not avail gay
couples of all of the privileges and benefits as other married couples.
Weighing the interests of both the individual and the government, a
court would likely find that the individual’s interest in marrying the person
of his choosing heavily outweighs the interest of the government in
regulating gay marriage. The fact that the government is regulating an
interest that is of such private, as opposed to public, concern weighs heavily
in favor of the individual and ultimately favors protecting the individual’s
right. Furthermore, the fact that the government has alternatives available,
but that the alternatives do not completely measure up to those available to
other married couples, shows that the government is not merely concerned
with providing benefits to more individuals. Rather, it shows that the
decision to not grant full benefits to gay couples is grounded in
discriminatory, rather than fiscal, concerns. In the end, the individual’s right
to marry whomever he wants and have the same opportunity to build a
family as any other married person is a strong and compelling interest that
would likely result in a court protecting the right of gay couples to enter into
marriage.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The problems associated with the history and tradition approach to
the fundamental rights doctrine are evident. The manipulability of history
and the inconsistent definition of rights result in a high propensity for
judicial discretion and abuse. The history and tradition standard has thus
outlived its usefulness by failing to provide the objectivity it promised to
deliver.
The proposed balancing test recommended by this Comment would
help rectify many of the issues associated with the history and tradition
standard while continuing to dedicate itself to protecting rights that society
deems inalienable. Utilizing the proposed balancing test, a court would
determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a right should be protected by
balancing the interest of the individual in keeping the right against the
government’s interest in regulating the right. Thus, so long as the
government has a legitimate reason for regulating the right and the
consequences of losing the right are not dire to the individual, the law
infringing upon the right will likely be upheld. If, however, the right is
highly personal and important to the individual and the state does not stand
to promote a valuable and collective interest, the law will likely be
invalidated as an impermissible infringement upon the privacy and
personhood of the individual.
The requirement for a judge applying this standard to engage in a
thorough explanation of both the background and relative weight of each
interest implicated in the case represents a clear guidepost that will help rein
in judicial discretion. The requirement for both clarity and explanation will
also lead to more predictable outcomes in future cases and promote
increased transparency into the decision-making process, which is essential
for appeals. The Court desperately needs tangible and recognizable
guideposts for its fundamental rights jurisprudence in order to curb judicial
discretion and to ensure that the Court does not exceed the scope of its
judicial powers and thereby continue its reversion toward unfettered,
Lochner era activism.
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